DUELING PROVISIONS: THE 21ST AMENDMENT’S SUBJUGATION
TO THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Drew D. Massey
I. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional provision limiting the power of the federal government is
slowly eroding away with the aid and compliance of the Supreme Court; that
provision is section two of the Twenty-first Amendment: “The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited.”1 The Supreme Court, however, has modified, altered, and rendered
meaningless this seemingly unambiguous language through the use of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.
Congress adopted the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution in order
to give states the right to regulate alcohol in whatever manner those states deemed
fit.2 The first cases regarding the rights of the several States to regulate alcohol
recognized the near total control that the Amendment provided.3 However, during
the past six decades, the Supreme Court has slowly whittled away at the Amendment
by validating several challenges on the grounds that the challenged laws violate the
dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution.4
This article focuses on the “wine wars,”5 the current and foremost example
of the Supreme Court’s rulings regarding the Twenty-first Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause. These cases have a common fact pattern; typically, the
state’s alcoholic beverage control laws (“ABC laws”) require that alcohol shipped to
that state pass through a three-tier system. Usually, the state’s ABC laws mandate
that a licensed manufacturer sell only to licensed wholesalers, who thereafter sell only

1

U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.

2

See discussion infra Part II.

3

Id.

4

Id.

See Gordon Eng, Note, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to Balancing the Twenty-First
Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct Shipping of Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1849,
1880 (2003).
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to licensed retailers.6 Only licensed retailers may sell to consumers.7 However, the
state exempts domestically produced wine, which allows local wineries to ship
directly to consumers without going through the normal three-tier system.8 States
have begun to allow in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers because of the
explosion of small, boutique wineries in recent years. Those wineries simply cannot
compete in the three-tier system.9 The states provide a tremendous commercial
advantage to small wineries by allowing them to bypass the wholesale and retail tiers.
These same wineries, however, have challenged laws that prohibit the direct
shipment of wine to individuals outside their states.10 Because the direct shipment
laws typically allow only in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, the
challengers rely on the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.11 Although academics
have long debated the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause, the doctrine is
firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution affirmatively grants Congress the
ability to regulate commerce.12 Justice Scalia noted that the Commerce Clause is
merely an affirmative grant, that courts have interpreted many Article I powers as
being concurrently held by state and federal government, and that there is no
correlative denial of power to the states.13

6

Id. at 1853.

7

Id.

8 See generally Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Granholm v. Heald,
124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va.
2002), vacated and remanded sub nom. Bolick v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2003).
9 Andrew J. Kozusko III, Comment, The Fight to “Free the Grapes” Enters Federal Court: Constitutional
Challenges to the Validity of State Prohibitions on the Direct Shipment of Alcohol, 20 J.L. & COM. 75, 76 (2000).
10

Id. at 76.

11

See generally cases cited supra note 8.

12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 231, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, Scalia noted that bankruptcy, patent power, copyright power, and court
martial jurisdiction over the militia were all shared by states, but granted by Article I. In addition,
there was no express denial of power as there was with the power to coin money. However, Scalia’s
criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause did not prevent him from writing an opinion in
opposition to the Twenty-first Amendment. See infra, note 181 and accompanying text.
13
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The dormant Commerce Clause springs from the logic that because
Congress has the power to regulate Commerce, if it has not so regulated, then
Congress must have intended for that area to remain regulation free – including
regulation by the several states.14 Therefore, it is not the Commerce Clause that
remains “dormant,” but rather Congress and the application of its regulatory
power.15 Broadly speaking, it is this logic that competes with the grant to the states
in the Twenty-first Amendment.
In the current court battles, the district courts, as well as the circuit courts,
are divided on how to handle dormant Commerce Clause challenges to states
claiming protection under the Twenty-first Amendment.16 Most cases have relied on
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting the Twenty-first Amendment’s
command.17 Yet, other courts have looked to the original intent behind the
Amendment, as well as the early Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Amendment, and responded with a different result.18 The Supreme Court, with its
decision in the case of Granholm v. Heald,19 has finally laid the issue to rest.20
In order to fully analyze the issues presented, an examination of the histories
of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment is necessary.
Part II of this article includes a history as well as a survey on the commentary in this
area. Part III examines the decisions of the lower courts, as well as the modern
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that serves as a background to the arguments in
Granholm. Part IV discusses how the Court reached its decision and what effect that
decision will have on anti-shipping and reciprocal shipping states. Finally, Part V
concludes the article.

14

Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875).

15

Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982).

16

See generally cases cited supra note 8.

See, e.g., Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, (E.D. Va. 2002), vacated and remanded sub nom. Bolick
v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2003).

17

18

See, e.g., Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).

19

125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).

20

See discussion infra Part IV.
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II. ANCIENT HISTORY
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause – Creation and Evolution
The Constitution expressly provides that Congress has the power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”21 As stated, this clause provides no textual support for a “negative”
or “dormant” aspect of regulation. An examination of the plain meaning of the
words does not reveal a denial to the states of any ability to regulate commerce.
Commentators and advocates of the clause, however, have found support for the
dormant Commerce Clause in the common law of the Supreme Court or in the
Court’s “subconstitutional” regime.22 Supporters of the dormant Commerce Clause
cannot argue that the Court is interpreting the Constitution itself because the Court
has always recognized Congress’s ability to legislate, thereby avoiding a “dormant”
state and correcting a judicial decision.23 Because Congress is not able to easily
change the Constitution and overturn judicial decisions, the Court cannot interpret
the clause itself.24
Others argue that the Court is not interpreting the Constitution but rather
the “silence” of Congress; if the Court mistakes or misreads that silence for
something it is not, then Congress is free to speak up and correct the Court.25
Although this theory would avoid the above constitutional concern, it creates yet
another. The Constitution expressly prescribes how legislation shall be enacted;
legislation requires affirmative action by Congress and the involvement of the
President.26 Thus one cannot reconcile total Congressional silence with this
justification for the dormant Commerce Clause.27 Where, then, does the Supreme
Court get its authority to invalidate state law?

21

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

22

See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).

23

Id. at 15.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 16.

26

U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2.

27 Monaghan, supra note 22, at 16. The Supreme Court itself has also concluded that “to attribute
affirmative legislative policy to legislative inaction” is rarely justified. Id. at 17. The Court has
observed that “‘[t]he search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a
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Some advocate that the court is actually creating “constitutional common
law.”28 Like statutory common law under admiralty, interstate boundary, and foreign
affairs cases, this specialized common law has developed in order to further the goals
behind the Constitution.29 A judicial tribunal only turns to common law when it has
no guidance from the appropriate legislative body. Therefore, Congress may
overrule the Supreme Court’s common law in the area of Commerce Clause analysis
because the legislature always has the authority to modify or reject the common
law.30 Opponents of the dormant Commerce Clause specifically reject this notion.31
They point out that “there is a significant difference between judicial creation of
statutory common law and constitutional common law: the former arises from
congressionally created authority and can therefore logically be overridden by
Congress, while the latter is supercongressional, and thus not subject to
congressional reversal.”32 This “constitutional common law” theory, like the others,
is flawed and insufficient to explain or even form a solid basis for the dormant
Commerce Clause’s existence.
Other commentators adopt the view that the dormant Commerce Clause is
beneficial because it prevents economic protectionism.33 In this ends-justifies-themeans analysis, they advocate the use of the dormant Commerce Clause because it
prevents the states from engaging in economic warfare.34 However, no evidence
exists that the framers intended the Commerce Clause to have this aspect or to be
used as a tool to prevent economic protectionism. Although the Framers were

mirage.’” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78 (1974) (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316
U.S. 4, 11 (1942)).
28

Monaghan, supra note 22, at 17.

29

Id. at 17-19.

30

Id. at 17.

See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 601-03 (1987).
31

32 Id. at 602-03. Because the very basis on which the common law is supposedly derived is more
authoritative than Congress, the term “constitutional common law” is an oxymoron. It implies both
higher and lower authority than Congress holds.
33 See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
34

See id. at 1110-12.
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attempting to fix abuses under the weak Articles of Confederation,35 they placed no
express restriction on states instituting economic barriers. By contrast, when
Australia developed its federal system, the Australian Constitution contained an
express restriction prohibiting states from regulating commerce between
themselves.36 Clearly the framers could have adopted a similar express approach.
Rather than prohibiting such conduct outright, however, the framers gave an express
grant to Congress allowing it to pass legislation to curb any excesses.37
There is some evidence, however, that the framers did not intend for the
Commerce Clause to deprive the states of any of their authority. Alexander
Hamilton seemed to argue against construing the Commerce Clause as an implicit
denial of state authority.38 In The Federalist No. 32, he points to only three ways in
which the Constitution of the United States could deprive individual states of their
authority. These limitations could only occur where (1) the Constitution expressly
grants an exclusive authority; (2) the Constitution gives a grant to Congress in one
place and a denial to the States in another; and (3) the grant to Congress makes a
similar power remaining in the states totally “contradictory and repugnant.” 39 The
Commerce Clause simply cannot fit into either the first or second category because
there is no mention of exclusivity nor an express denial anywhere in the
Constitution. To qualify under the third category in Hamilton’s regime, the states’
regulation of commerce would have to be contradictory and repugnant to the
Constitution, but it is not clear that this is the case. Hamilton gives as an example
the definition for naturalization.40 The rule against state definitions for naturalization
is repugnant because the text of the Constitution requires a “uniform Rule.”41 Thus
the implicit denial has support in the text of the Constitution.
Despite the dearth of solid constitutional foundations for the dormant
Commerce Clause, and notwithstanding the struggle in which academics engage to
35 Not the least of these abuses was the economic protectionism and warfare that ran rampant under
the Articles. Id. at 1114.
36

See Eule, supra note 15, at 429.

37

Id. at 430.

38

See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).

Id.
at
198
(Clinton
Rossiter
ed.,
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed32.htm.
39

40

Id. at 199.

41

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
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come up with one, the Supreme Court has had little trouble developing and
expanding the doctrine.42 The first birthing of the dormant Commerce Clause is
found in the dicta of Gibbons v. Ogden.43 Justice Marshall observed,
It has been contended…that, as the word ‘to regulate’ implies
in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it
excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would
perform the same operation on the same thing…. There is
great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied
that it has been refuted.44
Without giving it a label or creating a doctrine, Justice Marshall opened the door for
the later creation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The official question presented
in the case was whether a state could regulate in an area that Congress had already
regulated, a question which was answered in the negative.45
By 1875, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was fully developed and
rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence.46 In Welton v. Missouri,47 Justice Field
solidified the dormant Commerce Clause by declaring that Congress’s “inaction on a
subject…is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and
untrammelled.”48 If Congress specifically allows state legislation in a given area, then
the Court may not strike down laws in violation of the Commerce Clause. If
Congress specifically prohibits state legislation, then the Court must strike down
state attempts at regulation in that area. When Congress is silent, however, the Court
42

Monaghan, supra note 22, at 15 & n.81.

43

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see also Redish & Nugent, supra note 31, at 575.

44

Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 209.

Id. at 200-22. Justice Marshall asserted that the “sole question [was], can a State regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the States, while Congress is regulating it?” Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
Despite this singular question, he was able to provide support for the dormant Commerce Clause in
dicta. This dicta soon came alive and was named just five years later in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829). The court in this instance decided against using the power to
vitiate the conduct of the defendant, yet this is the first solid reference to the Commerce Clause in its
“dormant” state. Id.

45

46

See generally Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).

47

91 U.S. 275 (1875).

48

Id. at 282.
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makes the quintessentially legislative determination on whether state legislation is
appropriate in a specific area. To that end, the dormant Commerce Clause violates
the separation of powers principles in the Constitution. 49
B. The Twenty-first Amendment: The Honeymoon Period
1. State Law Before the Noble Experiment50
Prior to Prohibition, the states decided among themselves whether they
would be wet (allow alcohol) or dry (prohibit alcohol).51 Although states had the
right to forbid production of alcohol within their own borders,52 they could not
prevent the importation of alcohol into their state from another state.53 Courts
generally denied this ability to the states because Congress had not legislated on the
importation of alcohol, and therefore, under the dormant Commerce Clause, that
arena should remain free of state regulation.54 Congress moved to correct this
presumption with the Webb-Kenyon Act.55 The Act prohibited any importation,
manufacture, or sale of alcohol in violation of state law.56 Courts upheld WebbKenyon as valid, reasoning that if Congress had the power to eliminate the
importation altogether through its commerce power, it had the authority to limit
selectively only that commerce that the state prohibited.57 Webb-Kenyon soon
became irrelevant, however, when the states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment in
1919 and Prohibition began.
49

See Redish & Nugent, supra note 31, at 581.

50

Eng, supra note 5, at 1860 n.86.

Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment: A Call
for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. REV. 1, 5 (2004).

51

52

Id. at 5-6. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

53 See Anderson, supra note 51, at 6-7. See generally Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465
(1888).
54

Bowman, 125 U.S. at 482-83, 494-95.

55

Anderson, supra note 51, at 10.

56

Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2005)).

57 Anderson, supra note 51 at 10-11. See generally Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311
(1917). In Clark Distilling, the state statute at issue prohibited direct shipping both domestically and
from other states. Id. at 315-16. While it is not directly on point with the current direct shipping
cases, it does demonstrate that the Webb-Kenyon Act vitiated a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.

2005]

THE 21ST AMENDMENT AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

79

2. The Twenty-first Amendment
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and put
an end to Prohibition.58 Section two of the Amendment provided, however, that
“[t]he transportation or importation into any State…for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”59 This
language echoes the wording of the Webb-Kenyon Act, which was meant to prevent
the dormant Commerce Clause from interfering with state regulation of intoxicating
liquors.60 As states began once again to establish regimes to regulate alcohol, most
adopted the previously mentioned three-tier system.61
As modern courts attempt to construe the language of section two of the
Twenty-first Amendment, they often fall back on legislative intent, despite the
Amendment’s seemingly plain language. The Supreme Court’s post-Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.62 jurisprudence further complicates interpretation.63
Unfortunately, the Senate debates regarding the adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment are subject to numerous interpretations of legislative intent.64 As a
result, all sides point to statements in the debates that affirm their views.
As is often the case, the new Amendment was soon challenged. In 1936, less
than three years from the Amendment’s adoption, the Supreme Court had its first
58

U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.

59

Id. at § 2.

60

See supra notes 56-57.

See David H. Smith, Consumer Protection or Veiled Protectionism? An Overview of Recent Challenges to State
Restrictions on E-Commerce, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 359, 366 (2003).
61

62

377 U.S. 324 (1964).

63

See infra Part III.

See Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment and
the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J.
1619, 1636 (2000). Douglass points out three distinct interpretations that could be gathered from the
Amendment’s debates. First, that the Amendment did not preempt any other portions of the
Constitution, but merely returned to states the right to regulate alcohol. Second, that section two was
procedural and meant only to allow states that wanted to remain dry to do so. Third, that section two
was meant to entirely exempt states from the considerations of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1631.
Because this is the only Amendment passed by the people in state conventions rather than by the state
legislatures, however, there is strong reason to give the text its plain and ordinary meaning. See
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1909 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64
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chance to interpret the Amendment and refused to limit its broad language.65 In
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co.,66 the plaintiffs were licensed beer
sellers.67 State law, however, required an additional license and a fee to import beer
from other states.68 The Court noted that, prior to the passage of the Twenty-first
Amendment, this requirement would have been an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.69 Justice Brandeis declared in an 8-0 opinion that “[t]he words
used [in section two of the Twenty-first Amendment] are apt to confer upon the
state the power to forbid all importations which do not comply with the conditions
which it prescribes.”70 After pronouncing this broad interpretation, Justice Brandeis
specifically rejected any attempt to limit the language by announcing that, although
the plaintiffs requested the court “to construe the Amendment as saying, in
effect:…if [the State] permits…manufacture and sale [of alcohol within its borders],
it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms[, t]o say that,
would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting of it.”71 The
Court went on to reason that, under the Twenty-first Amendment, the state could
theoretically monopolize alcohol production and prevent any private individual or
company from importing or selling alcohol.72
In this way, the honeymoon period began, and the Court gave effect to the
plain meaning of the Amendment. The states were thereby empowered to limit
alcohol-related interstate commerce in any way they felt was prudent or necessary.
Young’s Market, then, operated as an exemption from the Commerce Clause.
Although the Court expressly reserved the question of whether economic
protectionism would be permissible,73 it is difficult to see how the broad language
65

State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60 (1936).

66

299 U.S. 59 (1936).

67

Id. at 60-61.

68

Id.

Id. at 62. The dormant Commerce Clause, operating by itself, would not have allowed the state to
effectively raise a barrier to interstate commerce by charging a fee for the benefit of importation. See
generally Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
69

70

Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. at 62.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 63.

73

Id. at 64.
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could do anything but support such a reading. Under the tenure of Young’s Market,
the state need not worry about whether a court would find its ABC laws violative of
the dormant Commerce Clause. Young’s Market relied on the plain meaning of the
text and came to the correct decision.74 Just as the Webb-Kenyon Act relieved
dormant Commerce Clause concerns before Prohibition, the similar language of the
Twenty-first Amendment should do the same after Prohibition.
The question reserved by Young’s Market (whether economic protectionism
was permissible under the Amendment) soon arrived.75 In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Comm’n,76 Michigan enacted ABC laws that prohibited (absent
excessive fees and bonds) importation from states that, in Michigan’s opinion,
discriminated against Michigan wineries.77 Indiana made Michigan’s list of
discriminatory states, and Michigan therefore denied Indiana breweries the ability to
ship to Michigan customers.78 An Indiana brewery sued on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated in order to enjoin Michigan from enforcing its ABC laws.79
It alleged that Michigan’s law was “retaliatory” and argued that it punished Indiana
for doing something that Young’s Market allowed it to do.80 The Court, however,
found such conduct totally within the power and parameters of the Twenty-first
Amendment.81 The Court declared broadly in another 8-0 decision that “the right of
a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by
the commerce clause.”82 This incredibly expansive language makes the Young’s
Market assumption into an express interpretation; namely, that the dormant
Commerce Clause does not invalidate or otherwise restrain ABC laws put into effect
by the states under the authority of the Twenty-first Amendment. While the
Supreme Court has never expressly overturned this proposition, dissenters have

74

See id. at 63-64.

75

See Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939).

76

305 U.S. 391 (1939).

77

Id. at 392-93.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 393.

80

Id. at 394.

81

See id.

82

Id.
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often cited it in more modern cases as those cases begin to restrict the Twenty-first
Amendment’s power.83
Even during the early years, however, courts did not find that the power
granted by the Twenty-first Amendment was absolute.84 In Collins v. Yosemite Park &
Curry Co.,85 the Park & Curry Company filed a suit to prevent the state of California
from enforcing its ABC laws.86 The Company was inside of Yosemite National Park,
a federal jurisdiction, and therefore beyond the reach of California laws.87 While
affirming Young’s Market, the Court asserted that, “though the Amendment may have
increased the state's power to deal with the problem;… it did not increase its
jurisdiction.”88 Collins simply held that ABC laws were the province of the state; but
where the state had no jurisdiction, the ABC laws, like every other state law, were not
enforcable.89 Collins represents a legitimate restriction on the power granted by the
Twenty-first Amendment. It does not limit the power itself, but it relegates the
power to the appropriate jurisdiction.

83 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 556 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see
also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 352 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 592 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bacchus
Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 282 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling, Co., 377 U.S. 341, 347 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 336 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
84

See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938).

85

304 U.S. 518 (1938).

86

Id. at 519.

87

Id. at 522.

88

Id. at 538 (internal quotations omitted).

89

See id.
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III. MODERN REALITIES AND JURISPRUDENCE: THE HONEYMOON IS OVER
A. ABC laws in the several states
1. Three tiers of distribution
After Prohibition, the states developed a three-tier system to control the flow
of alcohol within the state, a system still in place today.90 Under this system, licensed
manufacturers may sell only to licensed wholesalers.91 The wholesalers, in turn, may
sell only to licensed retailers.92 Retailers are the only tier allowed to sell to
consumers.93 The states intended for this system to displace the pre-Prohibition
system in which a producer sold directly to his customers; that system was thought
to foster alcohol abuse, corruption, and organized crime.94 In order to prevent
circumvention of this new system, and because taxes were generally collected at the
wholesale tier,95 states passed laws to limit or prohibit the direct shipment of
alcohol.96
2. Direct Shipments
Under the current “wine wars” fact pattern, the state in question allows
producers within the state to ship wine directly to consumers but prohibits
producers in other states from doing so.97 States generally defend the discriminatory
ban by contending that allowing only in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers
ensures that taxes are collected and that minors do not receive direct shipments.98
Essentially, they argue economics and temperance.

Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment,
85 VA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999).

90

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 355-56.

95

See id. at 356.

96

Id.

97

See generally cases cited supra note 8.

98

Shanker, supra note 90, at 357-58.
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Commentators have found fault with these justifications. They argue that
states do not seem concerned with the loss of tax revenue in other direct-toconsumer sales and that the states can prevent minors from getting alcohol through
technological means.99 However, neither of these arguments against the state is
necessarily true. Courts have found a similar law preventing direct shipment in other
industries facially discriminatory and have immediately struck it down.100 Alcohol
regulation may be the only area of commerce where a state can pass this kind of
discriminatory legislation to ensure that its taxes are collected. They are not whining
about their inability to collect taxes in other areas because they are simply resigned to
their fate. The dormant Commerce Clause would render any complaints useless.
Suggested mechanisms for preventing access of alcohol to minors via direct
shipment include the following: requiring adult signatures on delivery, placing
warning labels on the product, or requiring credit cards for purchase.101 Such
methods would be impractical or ineffective. Warning labels would do little to
dissuade an eager teenager. Requiring adult signatures would do more to hamper
delivery to adults, who would likely be at work when the delivery is made, than to
prevent access to minors. In addition, many minors have their own credit cards102 or
could “borrow” them from their parents to purchase alcohol. Allowing direct
shipments only from domestic wineries would ensure the state adequate power and
jurisdiction to prosecute and punish offenders.
This particular domestic-only approach to direct shipping laws is not the only
one the states employ. States like Kentucky avoid the concern of discriminatory
legislation by outlawing direct shipments of alcohol for both out-of-state and in-state
producers.103 Other states, like California, have enacted reciprocity statutes in an

99

Id. at 358-59.

See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
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Shanker, supra note 90, at 358-59.

102 See Michael Lopardi, Charging Your Way Into a Mess, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 18, 2004, at N3, 2004 WL
60048629.

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.130 (in-state), 244.165 (out-of-state) (West 2004). The Wine
Institute lists twenty-three other states prohibiting direct shipment of wine including Utah, Florida,
and Tennessee. See Wine Institute, Direct-to-consumer Shipment Laws by State for Wineries (2004),
at http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/analysis/intro_analysis.htm.

103

2005]

THE 21ST AMENDMENT AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

85

effort to encourage the repeal of laws prohibiting direct shipment.104 Under
reciprocity statutes, a consumer in State A, the reciprocity state, would be allowed to
receive a direct shipment from a winery in State B only if a consumer in State B
could legally receive a direct shipment from a winery in State A.105 The Court’s
decision on the permissibility of the domestic-only approach will impact the fate of
the anti-shipping and reciprocal shipping states.
B. The Supreme Court takes the Twenty-first Amendment to Task
Beginning in the 1960’s, the Court began to chip away at the power granted
by the Twenty-first Amendment. The tide turned from the near limitless power
under Young’s Market to a stricter scrutiny beginning with Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp.106 In truth, the Hostetter Court decided the case correctly but on
very incorrect principles.
In Hostetter, Idlewild, operated a store in New York’s JFK Airport, at which it
sold alcohol to departing international travelers.107 The customer received only a
receipt at the time of purchase. The alcohol was then loaded directly onto the plane,
and the customer picked it up at his destination upon landing.108 The New York
State Liquor Authority found that Idlewild was operating in violation of state ABC
laws,109 but the Court enjoined New York from interfering with Idlewild’s
business.110 Although some commentators have decried this case as the first to
misinterpret the Twenty-First Amendment,111 Hostetter should be seen as a
jurisdictional limitation similar to Collins.112 The district court found that “the Liquor
104 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2(a) (West 2005).
The Wine Institute lists thirteen
reciprocity states including Missouri, Idaho, and West Virginia. See Wine Institute, supra note 96.
105

See § 23661.2(a).
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377 U.S. 324 (1964).
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Id. at 325.

108

Id.
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Id. at 326.
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Id. at 327, 334.

See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Twenty-first Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 316
(2002).

111
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Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938); see Eng, supra note 5, at 1869.
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Authority has neither alleged nor proved the diversion of so much as one bottle of
plaintiff's merchandise to users within the state of New York.”113 Because none of
Idlewild’s alcohol was consumed or used within the state of New York, the court
could have limited its ruling to the jurisdictional issue, thereby affirming once again
the state’s increased power to regulate alcohol and confirming that the state must
confine its use of that power to its traditional jurisdiction.114
Instead of so limiting the ruling, however, Justice Stewart went on to
implicate the Commerce Clause and achieve a stark departure from prior
jurisprudence. The direction his opinion will take is clear in his statement of the
issue: “whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far obliterates the Commerce
Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely the passage of liquor through
its territory…for delivery to consumers in foreign countries.”115 Stewart then
attempted to grapple with the competing considerations. He first paid lip service to
prior jurisprudence by stating, “This Court made clear in the early years following
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment that by virtue of its provisions a State is
totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations” in regards to
alcohol.116 He then argued, however, “To draw a conclusion from this line of
decisions that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would,
however, be an absurd oversimplification.”117 Continuing on this line of reasoning,
Stewart declared that because each was part of the same Constitution, each must be
read in the light of the other.118 Although the Court ultimately decided the case on
the fact that New York was attempting to regulate beyond its borders,119 the

113

Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 328 (internal quotation omitted).

114

See Collins, 304 U.S. at 538; Eng, supra note 5, at 1871.

115

Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 329.

116

Id. at 330.

Id. at 331-32. Justice Stewart went on to proclaim that a “repeal” of the Commerce Clause would
be “patently bizarre.” Id. at 332.
117
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Id. at 332.
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Id. at 333-34.
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remaining dicta clearly put the formerly supreme Twenty-first Amendment in the
shadow of the dormant Commerce Clause.120
The vigorous dissent in Hostetter became the first in a long line of modern
cases to look to the legislative history of the Amendment for guidance. In the
legislative history, Justice Black found that the Senate expressly rejected the federal
government’s concurrent control of alcohol regulation.121 It seems that the Senate
feared that such concurrent power would be used to chip away at the broad power
intended for the states.122 Congress thereby sought to protect the right of states to
control alcohol throughout their territories by preventing federal interference.123 A
disapproving Court nevertheless used the dormant Commerce Clause to allow
federal interference on state regulation. Detractors claim Stewart mischaracterized
Idlewild’s business and that although there was no “use” in New York, there was
indeed “delivery” to Idlewild’s warehouses.124
Stewart’s opinion exhibits
inconsistency and an agenda. Stewart found a way to rationalize the decision he
wanted without considering all the relevant facts, the legislative history of the
Amendment, or prior jurisprudence.
As if to cement the Court’s new disdainful view of the Twenty-First
Amendment, the Court handed down Dep’t of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling,125
which also limited the application of the Amendment, on the same day as Hostetter.126
In James B. Beam Distilling, the distilling company imported liquor directly from
Compare Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332 (declaring that each provision must be read in light of the other)
with Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (holding that the
Twenty-First Amendment acts as an exception to dormant Commerce Clause challenges).
120

121 See Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 336-37 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s dissent is especially telling
because he was in the Senate during the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment. See Granholm v.
Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1908 n.2 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122

Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 337 (Black, J., dissenting).

123

Id. at 338.

Denning, supra note 111, at 318. In addition, Denning claims that Stewart phrased the issue the
way he did in order to avoid the Young’s Market cases and that he further avoided those cases “(i) by
claiming that through-shipment, not importation, was involved; (ii) by implying that New York's
liquor laws were to some degree preempted by the federal customs regulations enacted; and (iii) by
implying that the involvement of the Customs Bureau converted JFK into some sort of federal
enclave.” Id.
124

125

377 U.S. 341 (1964).

126

Id.
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Scotland. Kentucky, the state of importation, charged a ten cent per proof gallon tax
on the imports.127 The company argued that this was a violation of the
Constitution’s Import-Export Clause,128 and the state defended its ABC laws by
claiming protection under the Twenty-first Amendment.129
Prior jurisprudence did not constrain the James B. Beam Distilling Court
because the case involved the Import-Export Clause, and prior cases dealt primarily
with the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Stewart, writing again for the majority,
once more phrased the issues in the case in the most extreme terms: “To sustain the
tax…would require nothing short of squarely holding that the Twenty-first
Amendment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants
are concerned…. This Court has never intimated such a view, and now that the
claim…is squarely presented, we expressly reject it.”130 While conceding that the
Twenty-first Amendment would allow the State to flatly prohibit any importation
and to tax shipments after they arrived, the Court nevertheless denied the State the
lesser power to tax the importation.131
The Court’s deciding the case on the basis of the Import-Export clause
resulted in a strikingly logical conclusion: while the states have authority to tax and
lay duties on alcohol from state to state, the power of the Twenty-first Amendment
stops at the seaboard.132 Critics note that Stewart’s opinion is woefully incomplete
because it does not address the statements in the Young’s Market line of cases that
indicate that the states are to have the unfettered right to control alcohol.133 Yet
again, Justice Black dissented from the Court’s opinion that the Amendment applied
only to domestic liquors despite any such language in the Amendment.134 Black
continued to criticize the decision, arguing that the Court should not use an

127

Id. at 342.

128

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.

129

See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. at 343.
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Id. at 345-46.
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Id. at 346.
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See Denning, supra note 111, at 322.
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Id. at 323.
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James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. at 347-48 (Black, J., dissenting).
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important but older and more general provision to invalidate an equally important
but newer and specific exception.135
These two cases make limited inroads into the revocation of state power and
mark the turning point in Supreme Court jurisprudence. One can read them as one
case limiting the jurisdiction of state power under the Amendment (albeit with a
good amount of damaging dicta) and one case prohibiting the Amendment from
applying to taxes laid on foreign imports. The Court, however, cites these two cases
as gospel; it relies on Hostetter and James B. Beam Distilling nearly to the exclusion of
the earlier cases, the legislative history, and the plain meaning of the Amendment
itself.136
C. The Twenty-first Amendment Falls
The 1964 decisions of Hostetter and James B. Beam Distilling became launching
pads for a Court dedicated to the repeal of the Twenty-first Amendment.137 The
more modern cases cite to Young’s Market for the obligatory “states have broad
power” quote, but the newer series of cases rely far more on Hostetter and its progeny
than on any of the traditional sources.138 The Court itself has recognized its seeming
unwillingness to look at legislative intent, the plain text, or its early decisions.139
A triad of cases accosts, subjugates, and renders the Twenty-first
Amendment largely ineffective – Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias,140 Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp,141 and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.142 The first case
135

Id. at 348.

136

See generally infra Part III C.

137 Hostetter and James B. Beam Distilling are cited in all of the cases in this subsection that seek to limit
the power of the Twenty-first Amendment.
138

See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984).

See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1980). Justice
Powell asserts that it is unwise to look at legislative intent. See id. He further suggests that the Court
generally has looked to the plain text of the Amendment, but then he immediately qualifies it with
Hostetter and other cases that reject a plain reading of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. at 106-10.
139

140

468 U.S. 263 (1984).

141

467 U.S. 691 (1984).

142

476 U.S. 571 (1986).
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in the following discussion, Bacchus,143 revived the dormant Commerce Clause and
expressly applied it against a state operating under its Twenty-first Amendment
authority.144
In Bacchus, Hawaii imposed an excise tax on liquor sold at the wholesale
level.145 However, the state exempted the local Hawaiian beverages of Okolehao and
pineapple wine from the tax in order to encourage the domestic market.146 The
Court went directly to a Commerce Clause analysis and cited recent past precedent in
holding, “‘[no] State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business.’”147 The Court then proceeded through an elaborate
discussion of whether the wines were in competition with other, non-exempt wines
and whether the exemption was therefore discriminatory.148
Bacchus became an important opinion not because of the state’s flailing
attempt to avoid a dormant Commerce Clause analysis but rather because the court
made such short work of the Twenty-first Amendment.149 The Court was able to be
so cavalier with the treatment of a constitutional Amendment because the state
expressly disclaimed any reliance on the Amendment in a lower court and only
brought up the Amendment again when it realized that it could use the Amendment
to save the tax.150 Thus the Court was essentially able to devalue and undermine a
constitutional amendment on procedural grounds. Courts cite the language in
Bacchus time and again to support limiting the power of the Twenty-first

143

Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).

144

Id. at 275-76.

145

Id. at 265.

146

Id.

Id. at 268 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977)). This
statement of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the analysis of the state’s obligations and actions
under it come before and without any mention of the Twenty-first Amendment. See id.

147
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See id. at 268-69.
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See id. at 274-76.

150

Id. at 274 n.12.
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Amendment, yet they never mention the fact that the Bacchus Court devalued the
provision on procedural grounds.151
In dealing with its Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence, the Bacchus Court
very candidly admitted that it was deviating from its earlier decisions.152 Relying on
Hostetter, the Court effectuated a balancing test between the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.153 The Court would allow discrimination
only if the legislation sufficiently implicates the core concerns of the Twenty-first
Amendment154 The Court then handily determined that Hawaii’s laws did not
implicate core concerns; the core concerns, while not fully defined by the court, do
not include protection of domestic industry.155
Justice Stevens’ vigorous dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor, argued that the Twenty-first Amendment validated this tax even if
the tax were discriminatory.156 Stevens pointed out that the Court’s holding meant
that a tax is unconstitutional when it places a burden on liquor imported into a state
for use therein but does not burden local industry.157 Stevens further correctly noted
that the Court had previously heard and expressly authorized this scenario in Young’s
Market.158 Stevens also recognized that Hawaii had the power under the Twenty-first
Amendment to create a total local monopoly.159 He reasoned that if the state could
create a local monopoly, it should also have the lesser power of merely imposing a

151

See e.g., Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 584.

152 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 274. The Court professed rather matter of factly, “Despite broad language in
some of the opinions of this Court written shortly after ratification of the Amendment, more recently
we have recognized the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2 [of the Twenty-first Amendment].”
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Id. at 275.
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See id. at 276.
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Id.
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See id. at 278-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 282.

Id. In Young’s Market, discussed supra, the issue was an additional license fee required to import
beer. Similarly, Bacchus requires an additional tax on imported alcohol. Both were fees levied for the
importation of alcohol for use within the state.
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Id. at 286.
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tax on imported liquor.160 Despite Stevens’ forceful dissent, the Court successfully
incorporated strong Commerce Clause language in to any future Twenty-first
Amendment case. Unfortunately for the states, Stevens is correct that, under the
logic of Bacchus, any discrimination in pricing or taxing of alcohol would violate the
dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first Amendment cannot provide
salvation to such laws.
The second case demonstrating the Court’s corrosive handling of the
Twenty-first Amendment, Capital Cities Cable,161 was decided less than a month prior
to Bacchus. Capital Cities Cable involved the Twenty-first Amendment but not in the
traditional manner. In Capital Cities Cable, Oklahoma had a law banning television
advertisements for alcoholic beverages.162 Out-of-state cable companies who
serviced Oklahoma residents faced a troubling dilemma: either they would be fined
by the state for transmitting alcohol commercials into Oklahoma, or they would be
fined by the FCC for altering the advertisements.163 The Court first noted that
federal regulations, no less than federal law, would preempt state legislation through
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.164 What most concerns this note,
however, is that the state attempted to save its regulation by appealing to the
Twenty-first Amendment.165
The plain text of the Amendment does not support Oklahoma’s reliance on
it.166 Oklahoma did not seek to regulate importation or use of intoxicating liquors
but rather to ban a certain breed of commercial advertising.167 Despite all the power
the Amendment confers on states regarding the regulation of alcohol, it does not
provide the states with additional power to regulate advertisement of alcohol.
Instead of limiting its analysis, however, the Court saw an opportunity to
strike another blow against the Twenty-first Amendment. Displaying the dissonance
160

Id.

161

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
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Id. at 694-95.
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See id. at 695-97.
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See id. at 698-99.
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See Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 694-96.
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of its holdings, the Court spouted in a single paragraph that “[s]tates enjoy broad
power under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use
of intoxicating liquor within their borders.… [The] Court's decisions . . . have
confirmed that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal
operation of the Commerce Clause,” but also that “[w]e have cautioned, however,
that ‘[t]o draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow
operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would . . . be an absurd oversimplification.’”168 Initially the Court gave
broad power to the states, but by the end of the same paragraph, it took the power
back. The Court then promulgated an extremely narrow balancing test that largely
deflates any hope of the states ever relying on the Twenty-first Amendment. Writing
for the Court, Brennan declared that the test is “whether the interests implicated by a
state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first
Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements
directly conflict with express federal policies.”169
This excessively narrow test, later employed in Bacchus,170 destroys the
inherent power of the Twenty-first Amendment. The Young’s Market line of cases
pronounced that the Twenty-first Amendment acted as a complete defense to
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.171 That power has experienced a dramatic
reduction. Now, through judicial decree, the state’s asserted interests must be “so
closely related” to the “core” concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment before they
can excuse discriminatory laws. This concept is a novel and ad hoc limit on
constitutional authority. In essence, a state must justify any use of its “broad power”
as not just within the purview of the Twenty-first Amendment but also closely
related to its core concerns.
Finding a legitimate but “limited” interest,172 the Court in Capital Cities Cable
then balanced this interest against the express federal interest embodied by the
FCC.173 This case heralds the beginning of exactly what Congress intended the
Id. at 712-13 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964).
168

169

Id. at 714.

170
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Twenty-first Amendment, and Webb-Kenyon before it, to prevent. Whereas the
Amendment aimed to allow states to enact liquor laws free of federal influence,174 a
federal body would now weigh federal concerns against state concerns.175 In fact,
unless the state concerns are “closely related” to the federal body’s view of the
concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment, the federal concerns will always trump the
weighing analysis.
The last in the triad of cases is Brown-Forman,176 which operates as the final
nail in the Amendment’s coffin. The case concerns a New York price affirmation
statute.177 New York required any licensed seller of alcohol who sold to wholesalers
to fill out a form indicating that the price it was charging was no higher than the
lowest price it charged in any other state.178 However, Brown-Forman Distillers
offered certain “promotional allowances,” which were essentially cash payments
intended, but not required, to be used for the purchase of advertising materials
promoting Brown-Forman products.179 The New York Liquor Authority found that
this lowered the “effective price” in other states in violation of the affirmation
statute and attempted to revoke Brown-Forman’s license.180
Brown-Forman articulately applies the two-tier test now used in Twenty-first
Amendment cases.181 The case begins by stating the rule regarding the dormant
Commerce Clause: “When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further

174

See Denning, supra note 111, at 304-05.
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See Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 715-16.
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Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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Id. at 576.
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See id.
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Id. at 576-77.

180 Id. at 577. For example, if the seller charged a New York wholesaler $20, then, to comply with
New York’s statutes, it could not charge New Jersey wholesalers less than $20. But if it charged New
Jersey wholesalers $20 and then gave them a “promotional allowance” that amounted to $3 per unit
sold, the “effective price” would be $17 for New Jersey wholesalers and thus in violation of the New
York statute.
181

See id. at 584-85.
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inquiry.”182 Once the producer had filed its schedule of prices with the state of New
York, it could not thereafter reduce its prices in other states without risking the
revocation of its New York license.183 Therefore the Court concluded that the
“practical effect” of the law was to control prices in other states.184 For this reason,
the law directly regulated interstate commerce and was struck down without a
balancing of interests.185
The state brought up the pesky Twenty-first Amendment, however, and the
Court was forced to analyze it as well. The Court had little time or patience for a
Twenty-first Amendment contention. Indeed, the case mentions only in passing the
“wide latitude” given by the Amendment.186 Instead, it cuts right to the abrogation
of the Amendment’s power by citing directly to Bacchus and Hostetter.187 The Court
held that, because the effect of the law was to regulate prices outside the borders of
the State, an Amendment allowing regulation of “importation” of liquors into the
state could not possibly save it.188
In this case, the Court attempted to use sleight of hand to achieve its desired
goal. The Court invalidated the law under the Commerce Clause by emphasizing the
law’s effect on other states. It then used the same reasoning for why the Twentyfirst Amendment could not thereafter “save” the law, declaring that because the law
affected other states, the Twenty-first Amendment did not apply. It would seem,
then, that any violation of the Commerce Clause would result in the impotence of

182 Id. at 579. The court also explains, “when, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate
commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate
and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.” Id. (citing Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Although dormant Commerce Clause analysis is thus
split into two lines of inquiry, regulation of alcohol will almost always fall into the first line in which it
is directly discriminatory.
183

Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582.

184

Id. at 583.
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188

See id. at 585.
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the Twenty-first Amendment. Although Justice Stevens dissented, his analysis of the
Twenty-first Amendment reads more like a sad farewell than a strenuous defense.189
Three years later, the Court decided Healy v. The Beer Institute190 as a corollary
to Brown-Forman. The opinion of the Court in Healy merits little discussion because it
provided little analysis of the Twenty-first Amendment and instead relied heavily on
Brown-Forman.191 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, however, makes this case an
interesting companion. Scalia asserted that the “immunity” conveyed by the Twentyfirst Amendment will vanish if the law seeking its protection is discriminatory.192 In
this catch twenty-two, the Twenty-first Amendment provides immunity from the
dormant Commerce Clause unless the law would actually run afoul of the Clause. If
the dormant Commerce Clause would prohibit the action, then the “immunity”
evaporates. By this logic, the Twenty-first Amendment’s power is ephemeral and
exists in name only.
Though these cases represent the most direct attacks on the power and
authority of the Twenty-first Amendment, a series of other cases have invalidated
state laws regarding the regulation of alcohol, including laws providing different
drinking ages for men and women and restrictions on advertising.193
D. Circuits Split
Against this backdrop, the direct shipment litigation began. With two
important exceptions, the district and circuit courts applied the reasoning handed
down by the Supreme Court in Bacchus and Capital Cities Cable.194 While many of the
circuit and district judges often remarked on the “broad powers” the Twenty-first

189

See id. at 590-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

190

491 U.S. 324 (1989).

191

See id. at 341-42.

192

Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring).

193

Denning, supra note 111, at 324-25.

194 See, e.g., Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp.
2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
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Amendment guaranteed to the states, the powers are never broad enough to save
state statutes from invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause.195
1. The Seventh Circuit
The earliest of the domestic-only direct shipping cases, Bridenbaugh v. FreemanWilson, made its way to the Seventh Circuit’s docket and was decided in 2000.197
Judge Easterbrook began his analysis of the case by observing, “This case pits the
twenty-first amendment, which appears in the Constitution, against the ‘dormant
commerce clause,’ which does not.”198 For Easterbrook, then, this case was a duel of
authority between an express constitutional provision and a doctrine implied by the
Supreme Court.
196

In Bridenbaugh, Indiana had adopted the three-tier distribution system.199 The
state declared that it had done so to ensure “orderly market conditions,” which the
Court correctly pointed out was a “euphemism for reducing competition and
facilitating tax collection.”200 As part of this system, Indiana allowed local wineries to
ship directly to consumers but prevented wineries in foreign nations or other states
from doing the same.201
Judge Easterbrook departed remarkably from the Supreme Court’s
established Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. Rejecting a “core powers”
analysis of the Amendment, he pronounced, “[O]ur guide is the text and history of
the Constitution, not the ‘purposes’ or ‘concerns’ that may or may not have animated
its drafters.”202 The Seventh Circuit’s decision to discard the standard “core powers”
See, e.g., Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397. But see Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir.
2000).
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Id. at 849; accord Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted 541 U.S. 1062
(2004) (“The inquiry, in our view, should not allow the protective doctrine of the dormant Commerce
Clause to subordinate the plain language of the Twenty-first Amendment.”).
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analysis that had driven the Supreme Court in its decisions since Hostetter has
received heavy criticism.203
Reading the Supreme Court’s recent cases narrowly, Judge Easterbrook
found that “[n]o decision of the Supreme Court holds or implies that laws limited to
the importation of liquor are problematic under the dormant commerce clause….
[T]he Court has held, however,…that the greater power to forbid imports does not
imply a lesser power to allow imports on discriminatory terms.”204 By examining the
case as an importation case, Judge Easterbrook was able to distinguish Bacchus and
Brown-Forman on the facts.205 Those cases involved discriminatory taxation and price
affirmation statutes, respectively.206 In Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, as long as the
importation law is not discriminatory, it should be allowed under section two of the
Twenty-first Amendment.
Somewhat paradoxically, the Seventh Circuit denied any discrimination
inherent in the law because Indiana required that “every drop of liquor pass through
its three-tiered system and be subjected to taxation.”207 The circuit court reasoned
that all liquor must be imported by an Indiana wholesaler or retailer, which would
then be subject to the appropriate taxation, and that therefore all wine imports went
through the same tiers.208 Yet only wineries in Indiana could ship directly to
consumers.209 The Court concluded that there was no discrimination because out-ofstate wineries may directly ship wines from other states. The only requirement was
that they import the alcohol to Indiana wineries first.210
Concluding that no discrimination existed, however, was a fiction. Either
Judge Easterbrook was attempting to use judicial sleight of hand, or he simply did
not realize that discrimination remained. The state allowed Indiana wineries to direct
See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2002), aff’d, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2003).
203

204
205

Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
See id.
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See supra part III C.
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Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
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See id.
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See id.
Id. at 853-54.
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ship, thereby allowing them to reduce prices. If a California winery shipped directly
to Indiana, it would have to go through an Indiana middle-man, thereby raising the
price. To the Seventh Circuit, however, this was not discrimination if it read the
statute carefully enough. The law did not prevent foreign wineries from doing
something that domestic wineries could do. It merely required that all wines be
subject to Indiana’s tiers and taxes.211 Reading the statute in this light, one could
make a barely tenable holding that the law treated all wines the same and therefore
did not discriminate. Judge Easterbrook was able to get away with this decision,
however, because the plaintiffs in Bridenbaugh were Indiana residents, not wholesalers
or retailers, and therefore were able to receive direct shipments.212 Therefore the
statute did not discriminate against the plaintiffs in the same way as it did out of state
wineries that wished to ship directly to Indiana residents.
Judge Easterbrook was driven by history and the states’ attempts to close
loopholes in the law prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment.213 With
history on his side, Easterbrook obtained the correct result. Although the legislative
intent is ambiguous,214 the historical problems of the states, combined with the
adoption of section two and the Supreme Court’s early interpretations giving broad
plenary power to the States, makes a strong case that Congress meant for section two
to exempt states from Commerce Clause challenges concerning the regulation of
alcohol. Taking that into consideration, Judge Easterbrook’s decision was morally
correct, though it questionably evaded certain realities in order to avoid being subject
to binding precedent.
2. The Eastern District of Virginia, et al.
Other courts looked to and followed the binding precedent of the Supreme
Court. Bolick v. Roberts,215 was the first case to apply the two-tier analysis of BrownForman,, and soon other district courts in Texas, North Carolina, and New York did
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See id. at 854
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See id.
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See id. at 851-53.
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See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 2002), vacated as moot and remanded, 330 F.3d 274 (holding
that, because Virginia had altered some of the statutes at issue in the lower court, lower court’s
decision was moot).
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the same.216 Bolick was a magistrate’s recommendation, and while the magistrate did
not clearly explain the two-tier analysis, he did apply it.217 Bolick expressly rejected
Bridenbaugh as “improperly decided because it does not rely upon the established
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.”218 In Dickerson v. Bailey,219 the district court
spelled out the steps more clearly, but sped through the analysis. It declared that
because the domestic-only direct shipment legislation was facially discriminatory in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and that the Twenty-first Amendment
“core power” of temperance was not implicated because the measure was designed
for economic protectionism, the Twenty-first Amendment did not save the
offending legislation.220
The strictest court in this line of cases that applied the two-tier Brown-Forman
test was Beskind v. Easley,221 in which the court found that the direct shipping
legislation was a “cut and dry example” of a violation of the Commerce Clause.222
Because the court found no legitimate reason for the state to exempt itself from the
direct shipping laws, it saw those laws as pure economic protectionism.223 Once the
court deemed the ABC laws protectionist, the death knell of the legislation rang.
The court firmly stated that “[n]o equilibrium can be achieved when economic
protectionism is placed on one side of the scale, and the Commerce Clause's need to
preserve the respect of the several states for each other is placed on the opposite
side.”224 Under this scrutiny, the Twenty-first Amendment cannot save any facially
discriminatory law. The court applied a second-tier analysis in name only. It seems
that even if a “core power” were implicated, it could not “save” or reach an
“equilibrium” with a law offensive to the Commerce Clause.
216 See generally Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d
135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Dickerson v.
Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002) aff’d 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
217

Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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Id. at 408.
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212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002) aff’d 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).

220

Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d. at 675.
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197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506 (2003).

Beskind, 199 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471 (W.D.N.C. 2002) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506 (2003)
(the appellate court affirmed the unconstitutionality of the direct shipping laws in its entirety).
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Courts have recognized the Brown-Forman two-tier analysis as flawed.225 The
two-tier analysis inevitably shifts the burden to the states, essentially treating them as
“guilty until proven innocent.”226 Despite criticism, courts continue to ask the states
to explain themselves, and then they do away with the law, regardless of the text of
the Constitution, when they disapprove of the explanation.
3. The Eleventh Circuit
The district court in Bainbridge v. Bush,227 made an attempt at reconciling these
views. The case concerned the familiar fact pattern of a state allowing domestic
wineries to ship directly to consumers but preventing foreign wineries from doing
the same.228 The district court began its discussion by stating that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the states “virtually complete control over the importation and
sale of liquor” and that state liquor laws carry “a presumption of validity and should
not be set aside lightly.”229 The district court also recognized, however, that earlier
decisions had qualified this power, and the court prepared itself to execute a standard
two-tier evaluation of the direct shipping laws.230
Judge Whittmore, the district judge in the Bainbridge case, found a tier one
violation231 and then dropped to the second tier – whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saves the offending legislation.232 The district court looked to BrownForman and Bacchus but found that they did not require the law’s invalidation.233
Echoing the reasoning in Bridenbaugh, Whittmore held that Brown-Forman stood for
the principle of extraterritoriality.234 If a state’s ABC laws attempted to control
225 See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004) cert. granted. 541 U.S. 1062 (2004); Eng,
supra note 5, at 1901.
226

Eng, supra note 5, at 1901.

227 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated sub nom., Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F. 3d 1104 (11th
Cir. 2002).
228

Id. at 1308.

229

Id. at 1310 (internal quotations omitted).

230
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events outside the state’s borders, then the Twenty-first Amendment could not save
them. Similarly, Whittmore held that Bacchus stood against “mere economic
protectionism.”235 Mere economic protectionism would not allow the Twenty-first
Amendment to save discriminatory legislation. Courts have, however, allowed mixed
motives to stand,236 and the district court found such mixed motives in this case.237
For the district judge, implication of core powers without “mere protectionism” is
enough to save discriminatory legislation as long as the legislation does not seek to
control conduct outside of its borders.
This method seeks to reconcile the purpose of the Amendment with the
Supreme Court cases and the history leading up to its adoption. Yet Whittmore’s
construction met a roadblock in the form of the Eleventh Circuit. On appeal, Judge
Tjoflat vacated and remanded the case.238 Following the same path as the lower
court, the circuit court found the law facially discriminatory and offensive to the
Commerce Clause.239 The court then held, as did the lower court, that Florida’s
regulations did not regulate any conduct outside the state.240 Judge Tjoflat further
agreed with the lower court that extraterritoriality or mere protectionism would not
allow Twenty-first Amendment salvation.241 However, the circuit court’s analysis
was not over.
The circuit court created another hurdle for the states. The new element
holds that when a law implicates a core concern, “the Amendment removes the
constitutional cloud from the challenged law so long as the state demonstrates that it
genuinely needs the law to effectuate its proffered core concern.”242 This added
“genuine need” requirement separates the circuit court’s test from that of the lower

235

Id.

236 Id. at 1313 & n.12 (citing Milton S. Kronheim & Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193,
203-05 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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Id. at 1313 & n.11.
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court. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to give Florida the
opportunity to show a “genuine need” for the law.243
4. Certiorari granted
Michigan is the birthplace of Heald v. Engler,244 now termed Granholm v. Heald
after certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.245 Heald declared domestic-only
direct shipping laws invalid.246 Meanwhile, just a few states away in New York, the
Swedenburg v. Kelley court came to the opposite conclusion.247 These two cases
reached different decisions on similar fact patterns, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to both in a consolidated case in order to settle the question.248
In Heald, a familiar fact pattern arose again: a state allowing domestic
wineries to ship directly to consumers while preventing out of state wineries from
doing the same.249 The arguments of the parties pitted the dormant Commerce
Clause against the Twenty-first Amendment.250 As is often the case, the framing of
the issue hinted at the decision the court would make. The court stated the issue as,
“how the ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment interact to
limit the ways in which a state can control alcohol sales and distribution.”251 Under
the court’s formulation of the issue, the two provisions interact to limit the state’s
power. For Judge Daughtrey, the circuit judge in Heald, the Commerce Clause was
unquestionably superior to the Twenty-first Amendment.252

243

Id. at 1115-16.

244

342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003) cert. granted sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005).
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See id. at 527.
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Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).

See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004); Granholm v. Heald, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004); Neal R.
Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Antitrust Trade and Practice, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 2004, at 3.
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Heald, 342 F.3d at 519.

250

Id. at 519-20.
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Id. at 522.

252 See id. at 524. Daughtrey spoke quite plainly and argued that the Twenty-first Amendment “has
little value in a case requiring a Commerce Clause analysis.” Id.
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Judge Daughtrey combined the “core concerns” analysis with heightened
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.253 When a law is facially discriminatory and
therefore offensive to the Commerce Clause, it requires a high showing of proof in
Judge Daughtrey’s court; a nondiscriminatory method that would advance a “core
concern” of the Twenty-first Amendment must not exist.254 In this way, Heald
merged the “core concerns” inquiry with a very elevated Commerce Clause scrutiny
in order to produce an extremely difficult test for any state to pass. This merger has
the flaws of the Brown-Forman two-tier approach,255 yet it also incorporates a
heightened scrutiny analysis and forces the state to prove both the implication of a
“core concern” and that there are no less discriminatory alternatives.256
Judge Daughtrey criticized the lower court for not applying strict scrutiny
and for relying on reasoning analogous to the lower court in Florida.257 Not
surprisingly, the state was not able to meet the Sixth Circuit’s high burden, and the
court pronounced the statute unconstitutional.258 By contrast, the Second Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion.259 In a near opposite statement of the issue from
the Sixth Cirucit, Judge Wesley, writing for the Second Circuit, proclaimed, “[t]he
inquiry should be sensitive to the manner in which these two constitutional forces
interact in light of the impact the Twenty-first Amendment has on dormant
Commerce Clause concerns.”260 Looking to Bridenbaugh for support, the court
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s historical analysis test.261
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See id.

254

Id.
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See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.

See Heald, 342 F.3d at 525-26. The court summarized its test by declaring that a facially
discriminatory statute may be saved if it, “fall[s] within the core of the State's power under the
Twenty-first Amendment, having been enacted in the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring
orderly market conditions, and raising revenue[ ]…and…these interests cannot be adequately served
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Judge Wesley followed the example of Bridenbaugh and began with a history
of Prohibition and a recounting of the legislation and jurisprudence regarding
alcoholic beverages.262 First, the court first found that the State’s regulatory scheme
had legitimate purposes and was not mere economic protectionism as forbidden by
Bacchus.263 Rather than go through the requisite Commerce Clause analysis, Judge
Wesley looked to see whether the scheme fell within the purview of the Twenty-first
Amendment.264 Because it did, the court upheld the statutory regime as valid without
further inquiry into the dormant Commerce Clause.265
While Swedenburg adopted an historical approach, one that represented
probable intent as well as the Amendment’s first interpretations, it failed to follow
precedent by refusing to engage in a Commerce Clause analysis.266 Swedenburg
thereby opened itself to the same criticisms as Bridenbaugh. It seemingly abandoned
binding precedent in order to come to a conclusion that is morally, if not legally,
correct.267 Although this historical perspective test would be accurate and ideal when
dealing with a blank slate, Judge Wesley overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court
had already spoken in this area.
In order to put an end to the conflict in the circuit courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the Sixth and Second Circuits to resolve the question.268 The
Court granted certiorari for a single issue: “Does a State's regulatory scheme that
permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability
of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of
Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?”269 Oral argument occurred on December 7, 2004.270
262

See id. at 231-37.

See id. at 237-38 (“state laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are . . . not entitled to the
same deference as law enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.” Id. at
237 (quoting Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276)).
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The Supreme Court’s phrasing of the issue did not bode well for the states; the
Supreme Court took the “in light of” language directly from Hostetter.271 The Court’s
suggestion of looking at each provision “in light of” the other also indicated that it
would use some form of balancing test. Clearly the Court would not adopt the
historical perspective approach of Bridenbaugh and Swedenburg.272
5. In a Perfect World
The Court should have departed from its current line of cases and
recognized that the Twenty-first Amendment provides an exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine when the regulation of alcohol is involved. As argued
above, the combination of legislative intent, relevant historical background, and
initial expansive interpretation of the Amendment made a strong case that section
two of the Twenty-first Amendment should “save” any legislation offensive to the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.273 Only when a state attempts to use the
Amendment to extend its jurisdiction should the Court overturn such a law.274 This
principle of extraterritoriality appears in modern cases through the use of priceaffirmation statutes.275 Keeping in line with these cases, courts should not uphold
statutory regimes that seek to extend the control of a state’s law beyond its borders
by clinging to the Twenty-first Amendment. A state cannot directly legislate inside
another state’s borders; nor should a state have the power to legislate indirectly.
Bacchus, on the other hand, should have been overruled. Although it is
sometimes characterized by lower courts as representing a limitation on “mere
economic protectionism,”276 the courts should allow such protectionism. The plain
text of the Twenty-first Amendment declares that it is unconstitutional for a person
to violate the ABC laws of any state.277 Under the plain text, a state may establish a
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state monopoly on liquor production and importation.278 It is illogical to hold that a
state has the power to create a state monopoly over liquor but not a lesser power to
simply tax disproportionately or to exempt local business from certain regulations.
Bacchus is simply a bad decision that relies more on case law than on the
Amendment’s text, history, or earliest interpretations.
Understandably, however, the court was loathe to overrule one of the
defining cases of Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. The court, then, should
have adopted the reasoning of the Florida district court in Bainbridge.279 The fact
pattern in Bacchus is distinct enough to have isolated it from the rest of the alcohol
regulation cases. Bacchus did not concern a regulation on importation but rather a tax
and a tax exemption on certain kinds of liquor.280 The Supreme Court could easily
follow the district court’s example in Bainbridge and find that Bacchus stands as a
limitation on “mere economic protectionism.”281 In this way, it could hold true to
the purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment, give full (or nearly full) power to the
plain text of section two, and still retain the Bacchus and Brown-Forman line of cases as
representing limited exceptions for extraterritoriality and mere protectionism.
6. Party Briefs and Oral Argument
The Supreme Court’s recent cases display the Court’s suspicion of
protectionist implications and its favor of the Commerce Clause’s promise of a
national economic union.282 The makeup of the court has changed dramatically since
Hostetter, and even since Brown-Forman just two decades ago. Only three judges who
were present to hear Brown-Forman remained on the Court to hear Granholm and
Swedenburg.283 Yet the very different composition of the Court mattered little in the
Court’s trend toward the decimation of the Twenty-first Amendment.
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The Parties expected the Court to adopt the Brown-Forman two-tier analysis
and to apply it as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits did.284 The Court established this test
through Capital Cities Cable and Brown-Forman, and it was unlikely that it would
deviate from a recent pronouncement.285 Under this test, the regulatory schemes
involved are facially discriminatory and therefore fail the first tier. Accordingly, the
second tier is implicated, and the arguments centered on whether the legislation is
“so closely related” to one of the “core powers” of the Twenty-first Amendment
that it can be saved. The briefs of Petitioners and Respondents show extensive
debate over this issue.286
Petitioners began their argument by pointing out that the plain text of the
Amendment supports their position and by noting other cases in which the Court
looked first to the text of statutes in order to interpret them.287 However, the
Petitioners quickly commenced preparing for the second tier of the analysis by
arguing that regulation of alcohol within a state, collecting tax revenue, and
temperance were all core concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment.288 Petitioners
spent considerable time distinguishing the present fact pattern from Hostetter, Bacchus,
and other modern era Twenty-first Amendment cases.289
Respondents likewise prepared their brief with the two-tier analysis in mind
and devoted substantial space to arguing that the scheme failed both tiers.290 The
respondents began by emphasizing the character and purpose of the dormant
See generally Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir. 2003); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388,
395 (5th Cir. 2003).
284
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See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 584-85; Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984).

See generally Brief for the Petitioners, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No. 03-1116),
available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/webinit/tanford/wine/granholmmerits.pdf [hereinafter
“Brief for Petitioner”]; Brief for Respondent, Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005) (No. 031116), available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/webinit/tanford/wine/HealdFINAL.pdf [hereinafter
“Brief for Respondent”].
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Commerce Clause and the state’s failure to comply with its requirements.291 They
indicated that even plain text in the Constitution may still be subject to certain
qualifications and suggested that the Twenty-first Amendment is one such area.292
They read Bacchus and Brown-Forman broadly to show that, even when laws fall within
the Twenty-first Amendment’s plain grant of authority, courts have still found them
to be unconstitutional through the dormant Commerce Clause.293 Unfortunately for
the states, even an average reading of Bacchus and Brown-Forman supported the
respondent’s contentions. Predicting the court’s direction to be the same as that of
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,294 the respondents removed any doubt that less
discriminatory measures were available to the states to meet their needs.295
It is apparent that both sides readied themselves for a two-tier analysis.
While the petitioners made a brief appeal to history,296 neither side seriously
considered that the court would adopt the historical perspective approach of the
Second and Seventh Circuits.297 Although it would not be the first time the Court
adopted a standard that neither party had urged,298 such occurrences are rare.
Oral argument revealed a number of insights into the direction the Justices
were leaning. Stevens and Rehnquist had been solid dissenters in each of the cases
that pit the Twenty-first Amendment against the dormant Commerce Clause.299
O’Connor, likewise, dissented from Bacchus,300 and the three joined in dissent in
291
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Healy.301 Although these three Justices were presumptively in favor of the States,
reading the oral argument transcript reveals much more.302
The oral argument showed a Court that was very much concerned with
Bacchus and state discrimination.303 Justice O’Connor asked for methods of
distinguishing Bacchus and told the states not to plan on Bacchus being overruled.304
She probed for less restrictive alternatives to the states’ current action and thereby
hinted that the Court might have considered a strict scrutiny line of reasoning.305
Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, seemed to engage in academic testing; he expressed
concern for what effect the Court’s ruling might have on reciprocal shipping states306
as well as the three-tier system of distribution generally.307 However, as the states
began their arguments, Kennedy declared his support of Bacchus by announcing,
“[T]he language of Bacchus, in effect, restored the anti-discrimination component of
the Commerce Clause to liquor control. I think that's a fair and necessary reading of
the case.”308 By holding to this “necessary” reading of Bacchus, Kennedy dedicated
himself to the two-tier Commerce Clause analysis. Justice Ginsburg, by contrast,
focused almost exclusively on Bacchus and the dormant Commerce Clause in finding
that Bacchus stands for the principle of anti-discrimination.309 She asked incredulously
if the states would have the Court overrule both Bacchus and the dormant Commerce
Clause,310 thereby signaling her intent to apply the two-tier analysis. Her implication
that it would be absurd to overrule both is an echo of the language in Hostetter.311
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Justice Souter, likewise, seemed concerned with discrimination. He theorized
ways in which the states could make their requirements less restrictive, including the
use of audit by internet.312 The focus on less restrictive alternatives again indicates
that Souter may have been looking to strict scrutiny principles. He conceded that,
while alcohol may be treated as unique under the Twenty-first Amendment, “the
issue here is whether [the states are] really doing that in a way that supports [their]
claim of interest.”313 Therefore the Twenty-first Amendment may treat alcohol
uniquely as long as that treatment does not discriminate, which reaffirms Scalia’s
concurrence in Healy.314
Justice Scalia was unsympathetic to the states. He first refused reasoning
along the lines of the district court in Bainbridge, specifically, that Bacchus stood for
mere protectionism.315 He found instead that Bacchus encompassed importation as
well.316 Moreover, Scalia hinted at a core powers analysis in commenting that the
state must have a “good reason” to discriminate.317 Scalia also remarked that the
burden of showing a “good reason” was “a little higher” than merely bearing “some
relationship to their goals of protecting the integrity of the state's system.”318
Justice Breyer seemed sympathetic to the claims of the wineries when he
asserted that Congress meant for the Webb-Kenyon Act, and therefore the Twentyfirst Amendment, to void the dormant Commerce Clause as to the doctrine of
original packaging but not anti-discrimination.319 In addition, when Justice Kennedy
attempted to characterize the claims of the wineries broadly, Justice Breyer came to
the rescue and asserted that the wineries intended a “more modest” position.320
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Justice Stevens maintained his dissenter’s position. When Kennedy
mentioned the danger of the wineries’ argument to reciprocity states, Stevens
agreed.321 He found himself in the familiar position of dissenting in favor of the
states. The record was silent as to the minds of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas.322 Rehnquist was absent from the debate, and Thomas kept his peace.
However, because Thomas is generally a strict textualist323 and Rehnquist has been a
consistent dissenter,324 it was likely they would support the claims of the states.
IV. OMINOUS REPERCUSSIONS
A. An Opinion Rendered
The Court decided Granholm v. Heald on May 16, 2005.325 The case was a
narrow 5-4 decision in favor of the wineries.326 Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, and Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer joined the opinion.327
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice O’Connor joined,328 and
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined.329 Since the 1994 term, the Supreme Court
has delivered 175 decisions with a 5-4 majority; this is the first case in which these
five Justices have aligned to be the majority.330
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy did not begin with a legal analysis of
the issues but rather with a discussion of the economic pressures facing small
321
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wineries.331 He lamented that “small wineries do not produce enough wine or have
sufficient consumer demand for their wine to make it economical for wholesalers to
carry their products.”332 Yet Kennedy never explained what this economic analysis
has to do with the law. He instead made his decision from a policy standpoint. All
small businesses have difficulty keeping demand for their brand high; this is not
unique to the wine trade. Kennedy went on to criticize the “low-level trade war”
that domestic-only direct shipment laws, and reciprocity laws in particular, had
fostered.333 Again, this argument focused on policy and modern sensibilities rather
than on law or the text of the Constitution.
Kennedy began his legal argument with a discussion of the Wilson Act.334
The Wilson Act, predecessor to Webb-Kenyon, was Congress’ first attempt to allow
states to regulate alcohol free of dormant Commerce Clause concerns.335 The Act
came about because states had the power to ban domestic production of alcohol but
could not ban its importation from other states due to dormant Commerce Clause
concerns.336 The Wilson Act, however, only allowed states to regulate incoming
alcohol “to the same extent and in the same manner as domestic liquor.”337 Yet,
when the Court interpreted the Wilson Act, it found that the state could regulate
liquor only “upon arrival” and that a direct shipment to a consumer gave no
opportunity for the state to regulate the alcohol.338
Because of this “direct shipment gap,” Kennedy determined that Congress
passed Webb-Kenyon only to close the gap and not to remove alcohol from
dormant commerce clause scrutiny entirely.339 As support for this proposition,
Kennedy pointed out that Webb-Kenyon did not repeal the Wilson Act.340 Further,
331
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he argued that if Congress had truly intended to divest all Commerce Clause
protection, it could have inserted much clearer language.341 Through this
questionable reading of the acts, Kennedy disregarded much of Webb-Kenyon’s
effectiveness. His selective reading of the law allowed him to craft a ruling more in
line with his views on policy than on legal principles.
Turning to the Amendment, Kennedy gave the obligatory “broad powers”
reference.342 He immediately abrogated those broad powers, however, and even
suggested that the broad language in Young’s Market was dicta.343 The Court then
turned to Bacchus for guidance and expressly held that it reintroduced the
“nondiscrimination principle” into Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence.344 The
Court refused to overrule Bacchus or limit it to its facts as “mere protectionism.”345
Resting on Bacchus, the Court found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not
provide any protection against the dormant Commerce Clause in situations involving
discriminatory laws.346
Interestingly, the Court never discussed the “core powers” of the Twentyfirst Amendment.347 As Thomas pointed out in dissent, this omission is hopefully an
implicit recognition of the legal bankruptcy of that analysis.348 Instead, the Court
discussed what it had previously considered “core powers” in a general dormant
Commerce Clause analysis without regard to the Twenty-first Amendment.349
The Court examined whether the direct-shipping-only scheme may still be
saved despite its discriminatory character and despite the absolute failure of the

341 See id. Kennedy points to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which removed dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny from the insurance industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 1101 (2005).
342

Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903.

343

See id.

344

Id. at 1904.

345

Id.

346

Id.

347

See generally Granholm, 125 S. Ct. 1885.

348

See id. at 1925.

349

See id. at 1905-07.

2005]

THE 21ST AMENDMENT AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 115

Twenty-first Amendment to come to its aid. Following a more traditional
Commerce Clause analysis,350 the Court addressed two issues the States raised that
might allow them to maintain their “discriminatory” laws. The Court first dismissed
the allegation that direct shipping increases minors’ access to alcohol.351 For support,
Kennedy cited an FTC report stating that states that allow direct shipment have
reported no problems with underage drinkers due to increased access to wine.352 He
also referenced teenagers’ desire for “instant gratification,” which decreases their
desire to buy through the mail or internet.353 Kennedy further argued that, even if
direct shipping resulted in increased access, the state already allowed direct shipping
domestically. Because minors are just as likely to buy wine from a domestic winery
as from an out-of-state winery, the state already faces that problem.354 Apparently
the potential to exacerbate an existing problem is not an overriding concern in the
mind of the Court.
Similarly, the Court dismissed the states’ argument that the laws are necessary
to ensure the collection of taxes.355 The Court reasoned that because the states
issued permits to domestic direct shippers to protect themselves from tax evasion, it
could do the same with out-of-state shippers.356 However, this reasoning omits the
additional hurdles a state must overcome in order to enforce its regulations in other
jurisdictions – hurdles which do not exist for in-state offenders.
The final ruling of the Court began with mere lip service to the “broad
powers” of the Twenty-first Amendment: “States have broad power to regulate
liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. . . . If a State chooses to allow
direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms.”357 One can hardly
describe these severely limited and curtailed “powers” under the Amendment as
“broad.” There are now more exceptions to the power of the Twenty-first
Amendment than actual instances in which states may use that power.
350
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out that if Congress can abrogate the
presumption of the dormant Commerce Clause, then surely the people of the United
States can do so by passing an amendment to the Constitution.358 Joined by
O’Connor, a large part of Stevens’ brief dissent was an answer to Kennedy’s remarks
lamenting how domestic-only direct shipping laws have become a burden in the
modern economy.359 Although much of the social condemnation that enshrined
alcohol as a special item of commerce through enactment of the Eighteenth and
Twenty-first Amendment has faded away, the law has not changed. Because the law
was enacted as an amendment to the Constitution, it should be changed through
another amendment rather than through judicial “interpretation.” Stevens pointed
out a number of discriminatory activities that occurred just after the passage of the
Twenty-first amendment.360 This early discrimination indicates that the original
understanding of the amendment is in direct contradiction to the Court’s reading of
the text in this case.
Disputing the majority’s reading of the history of the Amendment, Justice
Thomas wrote a lengthy dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens and O’Connor.361 Before even reaching the issue of the Twenty-first
Amendment, Thomas concluded that Congress negated the dormant Commerce
Clause through the Webb-Kenyon Act, which is still law.362 Thomas then criticized
the majority for its holding that the Act immunized only “generally applicable” laws
from the Commerce Clause.363 Thomas condemned this reading as an “ad hoc”
judicial addition to Webb-Kenyon’s text.364 He further described the erroneous
nature of the Court’s ruling by noting that when an act removes dormant Commerce
Clause concerns, it does so in its entirety. It does not need to specifically list all the
kinds of laws that are now beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.365
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Thomas further disputed the Court’s reading of the Wilson and WebbKenyon Acts. According to Thomas, Webb-Kenyon’s removal of the Wilson Act’s
requirement that imported liquor be regulated “to the same extent and in the same
manner” as in-state liquor is even more compelling evidence that Webb-Kenyon
eliminates dormant Commerce Clause concerns where alcohol is involved.366
Delving deeper into the majority’s historical recount, Thomas found that the Court
unnecessarily narrowed the holding of Clark Distilling v. W. Md. Ry. Co.,367 by saying
that it applied only to “nondiscriminatory” state laws.368 He argued, “Clark Distilling
recognized that the Webb-Kenyon Act took ‘the protection of interstate commerce
away from all receipt and possession of liquor prohibited by state law.’”369 In fact, earlier
versions of the Webb-Kenyon Act contained amendments retaining the
nondiscrimination principle, but those were removed.370 Again, this change indicates
that Congress meant for Webb-Kenyon to remove alcohol from dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny.
Turning to the Twenty-first Amendment itself, Thomas remarked that the
language of the Constitution is even broader than Webb-Kenyon, and if the Act
allows discrimination, then the Amendment certainly allows it.371 Stating his case
simply, Thomas argued, “The widespread, unquestioned acceptance of the three-tier
system of liquor regulation,…and the contemporaneous practice of the States
following the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment confirm that the
Amendment freed the States from negative Commerce Clause restraints on
discriminatory regulation.”372 Thomas continued to chide and rebuke the Court for
ignoring the large consensus that established the meaning of the Twenty-first
Amendment and instead relying on “scattered academic and judicial commentary.”373
Finally arriving at the modern Twenty-first Amendment cases, Thomas
began an attack on Bacchus: “Bacchus should be overruled, not fortified with a
366
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textually and historically unjustified ‘nondiscrimination against products’ test.”374 He
argued that, although the Amendment did not repeal the Commerce Clause, the
Commerce Clause did not justify Bacchus’s narrowing of the Amendment’s power.375
Thomas declared, “Authorizing States to regulate liquor importation free from
negative Commerce Clause restraints is a far cry from precluding Congress from
regulating in that field at all.”376 Further, the breadth of the Twenty-first
Amendment is not an excuse for ignoring the independent authority of the WebbKenyon Act.377
In conclusion, Thomas made a similar point to the argument advanced by
Stevens. He criticized Kennedy for beginning his opinion with an appeal to policy
rather than to legal principles.378 Thomas ended by comparing the majority to those
earlier Justices who crafted opinions that ignored the Acts of Congress, thereby
necessitating the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.379
B. Fallout
Granholm is a landmark decision that has laid to rest the question of
domestic-only direct shipping’s constitutionality.
In addition, it will have
repercussions in other states using alternative methods for regulating alcohol. The
domestic-only direct shipping regime is not the only one that states employ. Two
other systems are also extensively used: anti-shipping and reciprocal shipping.
Granholm is the new Bacchus. It explicitly subjects the Twenty-first
Amendment to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny and expressly eliminates much
of the Amendment’s power by holding that laws must be “evenhanded” in order for
the Amendment to apply.”380 The Court’s decision in the domestic-only direct
shipping regime will be highly persuasive in the reciprocal direct shipping and anti-
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shipping regimes.
Granholm.

Both sides will analogize to or distinguish themselves from

California is representative of the states with reciprocal shipping laws.381
Reciprocal shipping states allow their citizens to receive direct shipments of alcohol
from a producer in any state that allows its citizens to receive shipments from the
reciprocal state.382 These states have the most to fear from the ruling in Granholm.
These laws would certainly fail the Commerce Clause tier one test. The Commerce
Clause abhors economic discrimination and economic protectionism,
And
reciprocal states engage in both. A reciprocal state discriminates based on geography
to at least the same extent as the direct shipping states. That geography may change
based on the laws of the other forty-nine states, but the discrimination is still present.
In addition, reciprocal shipping regimes set up the kind of barriers and retaliatory
economic policies that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has sought to
avoid.
Furthermore, these statutory regimes implicate the principle of
extraterritoriality. They provide incentive for other states to change their laws as
well. Other states will face pressure from liquor lobbyists to adopt reciprocal
regimes even if reciprocal shipping laws are not the best strategy for the state.
Although this scenario is less severe than the extraterritoriality involved in BrownForman, it is nonetheless present, and it remains an indirect attempt at influencing
and coercing the laws of other states.
An analysis of the reciprocal state’s situation under Granholm indicates that
the Twenty-first Amendment does not immunize those laws. The constant theme
throughout Granholm is discrimination.383 Under Granholm, discriminatory practices
not only mandate a failure of the first tier Commerce Clause test; in addition,
traditional (formerly “core powers”) concerns are not enough to avoid a failure of
the second tier.384 Further, the central holding of Granholm is that the Twenty-first
Amendment provides no shelter to discriminatory laws.385 Because reciprocal
shipping states engage in geographic discrimination, and because courts have
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declared that behavior unlawful, reciprocal shipping laws will fall wherever they are
challenged.
Other states have decided to avoid the debate completely and prevent direct
shipping in its entirety.
These anti-shipping states are the antithesis of
discrimination. Kentucky serves as an excellent example of a member of the antishipping states.386 In Kentucky, it is illegal to ship alcohol directly to anyone who is
not a licensed wholesaler or distributor.387 The state supports its prohibition by
declaring that any direct shipment after the first is a class D felony.388
Anti-shipping states have little to fear from the decision in Granholm. Every
drop of liquor passes through their three-tier systems. Whether shipped into the
state and sent through the tiers or produced in the state and passed through the tiers,
nothing gets to the consumer without first being handled by all three tiers. However,
even though Kentucky does not discriminate between in state and out of state
alcohol, it would still fail tier one scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause
because it prevents some interstate commerce (direct shipments from other states).
The Twenty-first Amendment, however, would save the law in the second tier.
Many states enacted the three-tier system just after the ratification of the Twentyfirst Amendment,389 and the Supreme Court has previously held that system valid
under the Twenty-first Amendment.390 Therefore the Commerce Clause has no
power to invalidate Kentucky’s laws.
This situation creates a sad state of affairs for the Twenty-first Amendment.
It can very rarely, at best, “save” a statute offensive to the dormant Commerce
Clause. When there is no discrimination, the Amendment is hardly necessary. The
Twenty-first Amendment is being quietly swept under the rug, soon to become an
unnecessary appendix-like attachment to the Constitution. Perhaps the “broad
power” spoken of by the Supreme Court is just this – a simple euphemism that
means only the power to require all alcohol go through the three tiers and to ban all
direct shipments.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should abandon its current agenda of chipping away at
the Twenty-first Amendment and instead give it the force it deserves. Because of the
decision in Granholm, reciprocity states will find themselves looking down the barrel
of a lawsuit. States will have to choose between allowing direct shipments from
every state, meaning officials in Maine would have to inspect wineries in Southern
California and accrue the associated expense, or closing up completely and denying
their citizens the chance to buy boutique wines. Either the state will have to raise
taxes to pay for added inspections, or it will have to deny its consumers available
products. One way or the other, the state must injure its consumers.
Many direct shipping proponents view the debate as old economy vs. new
economy.391 The three tiers are merely barriers to be circumvented in order to allow
e-commerce to flourish. To that end, one litigant has thrust its blade deep into the
powers of the Twenty-first Amendment, eager to draw blood.392 Costco, a provider
of bulk goods at low prices, is bringing an action in Washington state court seeking
to bypass the three-tier system entirely.393 If the debate is really a struggle of old
methods vs. new methods, then the three-tier system will eventually give way.
Unfortunately, it will do so at the expense of the Constitution. If that is the goal,
Congress should repeal the Amendment according to constitutionally prescribed
methods rather than having the Supreme Court interpret the Amendment into
oblivion.
Although the Washington court will certainly rebuff Costco’s challenge – if
only due to the Court’s prior approval394 and simple historical inertia – it will not be
long before more challenges arise. The market is too tempting for producers to
allow the barriers to stand. It is merely a matter of time before judicial action makes
the Twenty-first Amendment into a dead letter.
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